Bankruptcy Revision: Procedure and Process by Rendleman, Douglas R.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 53 | Number 6 Article 3
10-1-1975
Bankruptcy Revision: Procedure and Process
Douglas R. Rendleman
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation





This article is about bankruptcy procedure and the bankruptcy
process. It begins with a short analysis of problems under the former
regime, the Bankruptcy Act unencumbered by the recently effective
rules. Then, it moves to the rules and analyzes their impact. Finally,
bankruptcy procedure under the Proposed Act is discussed. The ar-
ticle presupposes some knowledge of bankruptcy. It is not intended
as a practitioner's guide to bankruptcy procedure. This worthy task
has already been accomplished.1 The article focuses on the no- or
nominal-asset nonbusiness or consumer bankruptcy. Numerically the
most significant, such proceedings compose around ninety percent of
the total bankruptcy filings. Characteristics of bankruptcy procedure
will be identified by analyzing the role of the bankrupt, the lawyer,
and the decisionmaker under each of the three models.
The article's unifying purpose is to locate adherence to and depar-
tures from the adversary system in bankruptcy procedure. Under the
Act, the adversary system created palpable administrative burdens.
Both the rules and the Proposed Act recognize and attempt to obviate
these burdens. The procedural responses reflect views of bankruptcy,
the legal system, and human nature. Differences will appear, be iden-
tified, and examined. These differences and the apparent underlying
premises will be discussed. Further generalizations will, it is hoped,
emerge. These concern the way policymakers perceive and respond
to a social problem.
I. CHOOSING A PROCEDURAL SYSTEM
Legal principles expressed abstractly as substantive rules are
meaningless except in the context of the decisionmaking process. Legal
t Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of Wil-
liam and Mary. The author wishes to express profound gratitude to Ms. Joanne Foil
of the University of North Carolina School of Law for research assistance in the pre-
paration of this article.
1. E.g., INsTrrtrE oF CoNTnINrNG LEGAL EDUcATION, BANKRUPTCY UNDER THE
NEW RuLus OF PROCEDURE (L. Lempert ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as NEw RULES
OF PROCEDURE]; Bare, The New Rules in Straight and Chapter XIII Bankruptcies, 41
TENN. L. RyV. 567 (1974); Lee, The Changing Bankruptcy Process, 62 KY. L.J. 909
(1974); Levit, The New Bankruptcy Rules, 57 MARQ. L. REv. 1 (1973).
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institutions cannot convert disputes directly into results without impos-
ing any cost because the enforcement of legal rights is expensive and
time-consuming. Governmental procedures-judicial, administrative,
and legislative-create, refine, and maintain legal rights. Ultimate jus-
tice mandates expensive, time-consuming procedure. The world, how-
ever, must move on. Procedural systems accommodate the quest for
ultimate justice with expeditious and inexpensive internal rules. But the
process should produce decisions which advance substantive principles
in a high proportion of cases. Moreover, the law possesses symbolic
and ritual functions. "Ijimportant as it [is] that people should get
justice, it [is] even more important that they should be made to feel
and see that they [are] getting it."2
The adversary system of resolving disputes enjoys considerable
popularity. It presupposes that interested persons will participate in
shaping the result. Full participation through trained advocates leads
to socially acceptable results.3 Civil procedure in courts of general
jurisdiction is based on these premises. But in other decisionmaking
environments, many thinkers view trial-type hearings as costly and of-
ten unnecessary.4 Thus, policymakers often consider alternatives to
the adversary system. But, before dismissing the adversary system, we
must discuss recent scholarship in this field.
Professors Thibaut and Walker used psychological laboratory
technique to examine the way "participating" disputants, observers, de-
cisionmakers, and attorneys perceive and respond to procedural mo-
dels. Their empirical research illuminates the illusive search for "the
more just decisionmaking procedure." 5  Some of their conclusions are
2. 2 J. ATLAY, VICTORIAN CHANCELLORS 460 (1908).
3. Thode, The Ethical Standard for the Advocate, 39 TExAs L. REv. 575, 587-
92 (1961).
4. K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATrVE LAW TE=T § 7.05 (1972).
5. Thibaut, Walker, LaTour, & Houlden, Procedural Justice as Fairness, 26 STAN.
L. REv. 1271, 1273-75 (1974). Professors Walker and Thibaut have developed a
method to analyze decisionmaking systems. They describe five models in a continuum
of declining decisionmaker control over procedure. The first model is inquisitorial. In
an inquisitorial system, a decisionmaker interacts with the disputants. The decision-
maker retains almost total control of fact development by seeking out witnesses, channel.
ing the inquiry, and reaching a decision. For analytical purposes, the inquisitorial sys-
tem will be characterized as non-adversary.
Thibaut and Walker call the second model "single investigator." It modifies the
inquisitorial system by assigning an investigator or hearing examiner to a "moderately
activist decisionmaker." The model defines the investigator as "an impartial and unbi-
ased truthseeker" but places him under the decisionmaker's control. The disputants fur-
nish requested information to the investigator; the investigator makes a detailed report;
and the decisionmaker decides the controversy. The disputants are, to a degree, re-
sponsible for shaping the facts. The decisionmaker filters the factual data. Thus, the
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striking. When allowed to choose freely, research subjects prefer the
adversary system. This is apparently because the adversary system ac-
cords both disputants an equal opportunity to develop data and to con-
trol the decision process.6 Secondly, because the adversary system
may goad the advocate for the "factually disadvantaged" to search dili-
gently for data, the adversary system may distort the decisionmaking
process in favor of that disadvantaged party.7 This is perceived as
fairer: so long as opportunities are equal, subjects preferred pro-
cedures which favor the disadvantaged.8 Finally, the experimental re-
sults support the proposition that the adversary system counteracts a
decisionmaker's tendency to be biased toward one disputant.9
Thus, in terms of doing justice and appearing to do justice, Wal-
ker and Thibaut prefer the adversary system. Substantial, compelling
reasons should appear before an adversary system is converted to an
inquisitorial process. But procedure reflects the environment; not all
conflicts are appropriately resolved by adversary litigation. First, there
must be a controversy: a significant dispute which is worth pursuing.
Secondly, delay and expense impose an increased decision cost which
may qualify the preference for the adversary system. Society cannot
afford to sift every controversy until the parties locate and resolve the
last disputed kernel of contention; the government cannot bear to
spend one thousand dollars deciding a one hundred dollar case. Thus,
single investigator model dilutes the decisionmaker's power. But the disputants neither
choose the factual data nor present it directly to the decisionmaker. The single investi-
gator model falls short of the adversary system.
The third model, based on United States court-martial, is a variant of the second.
It is called "double investigator" because two investigators assist the decisionmaker. But,
while both investigators are employed by the decisionmaker, they are charged with plan-
ning and developing the disputants' contentions and are asked to assist in reaching a
just result. This model facilitates cooperation but places the investigators in a more ad-
versary posture than either of the inquisitorial models.
The adversary system is the fourth model. It is the civil procedure system familiar
to American lawyers. Under the adversary system, the judge-decisionmaker is "rela-
tively passive." Openly biased adversaries represent the disputants, develop the legal-
factual contentions, and present the case to the decisionmaker. The decisionmaker, with
some exceptions, decides the disputants' controversy upon the matter presented.
In bargaining, the fifth model, the decisionmaker vanishes. The disputants or their
representatives meet, negotiate, and attempt to resolve the controversy without outside
assistance. The bargaining process, while completely controlled by the disputants, oper-
ates in the shadow of the formal dispute resolving system. One disputant may cease
to negotiate and resort to the formal machinery. This forces a decision and brings the
government's coercive enforcement powers to bear. Id.
6. Id. at 1288-89.
7. Lind, Thibaut, & Walker, Discovery and Presentation of Evidence in Adversary
and Nonadversay Proceedings, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1129 (1973).
8. Thibaut, Walker, LaTour, & Houlden, supra note 5, at 1288.
9. Thibaut, Walker, & Lind, Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal Decision-
making, 86 HARv. L. RFv. 386 (1972).
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as urgency in time and expense increase, people are more willing to
accept less party control and more autocratic decisionmaker control.
The Thibaut-Walker empirical analysis envisions a continuum
from inquisitorial to adversary. The shift in bankruptcy procedure is
from modified adversary to social welfare-administrative. Moreover,
delay and expense in an adversary system affect decisions about
whether to retain it but cannot be fully tested experimentally. Finally,
bankruptcy controversies differ from the controversies about which
Thibaut and Walker asked their subjects. But the important factors
to consider in choosing a procedural system are discussed by Thibaut
and Walker. When policymakers structure a process to resolve dis-
putes, they should consider these factors carefully.
H. CHARACTERISTICS OF BANKRUPTCY
Bankruptcy differs from most adversary litigation. In ordinary
civil litigation, the plaintiff asks the tribunal to find facts and reach legal
conclusions in his favor. After this is satisfactorily accomplished, the
defendant is compelled to pay the plaintiff. In bankruptcy, a debtor
asks the court. system to "discharge" debts. Creditors are forbidden
from collecting.10 No assets flow as a perquisite of victory; instead,
assets cease to flow or are prevented from flowing. Thus, to the extent
bankruptcy resembles litigation, it resembles equitable in personam or
injunctive litigation rather than in rem or money-recovering litigation."'
As a price of discharge, the bankrupt surrenders his non-exempt
assets to be converted into cash and distributed to the creditors. But
these assets are always worth less than the bankrupt owes. The previ-
ous paragraph must be qualified by adding that if the bankrupt has
some assets, the creditors may receive something. This introduces two
additional elements. The system must gather, administer, and distri-
bute the debtor's assets. Also, the creditors compete among them-
selves for these assets. In allowing conflicting claimants to settle
claims to limited assets, bankruptcy resembles interpleader.12 In al-
lowing a private trustee, supervised by the court, to gather, administer
10. See Bankruptcy Official Form No. 24 in BANxIRiupcY ACT AND RULES (Col-
lier pamphlet ed. 1975) (Discharge of Bankrupt) [hereinafter cited as Bankruptcy Form
No.].
11. Compare id. (creditors "enjoined from instituting or continuing any action or
employing any process to collect ... debts [discharged]") with FED. R. Civ. P. Illustra-
tive Form No. 32 (Judgment on Decision by the Court) ("It is Ordered and Adjudged
that the Plaintiff A.B. recover of the defendant C.D. the sum of ..
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970).
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and distribute assets, bankruptcy resembles equity's administering of
a decedent's estate. From their beginning, equity courts have been
administrative courts. Early equitable courts administered decedent's
and incompetent's estates; modem courts of equity possess consider-
able administrative power, as witnessed by the federal courts' role in
desegregating schools.
Bankruptcy became horrendously complex. It must be as com-
plex as the economy it reflects and the irreconcilable conflicts it at-
tempts to reconcile. While the legal profession assumes that lawyers
and judges are generalists, specialist judges preside in bankruptcy,' 3
and lawyers who are bankruptcy experts handle a high proportion of
the cases.' 4 Lawyers with a general practice enter bankruptcy court
at their client's peril. In addition, a mist of ignorance shrouds bank-
ruptcy; neither science nor reason dispell this ignorance. We simply
do not know much about bankruptcy.' 5 Furthermore, much of that
we do know is irrelevant.'"
Perhaps, as Professor Stone pointed out, the extraordinary nature
of the discharge may explain bankruptcy's technical procedure and ab-
struse substance. Society believes that people should pay just debts.
Exceptions through discharge should avoid becoming "either too easy
or too attractive" because "the very technical nature of [bankruptcy]
. . . stem[s] from the notion that escape from the ordinary effect of
a contractual obligation must of necessity be well guarded and en-
shrined in ritual, since society wishes it to be considered as abnormal
conduct.' 7
III. BANKRUPTCY UNDER THE ACT
The Bankruptcy Act' is a mess. The kindest statement is that
the Bankruptcy Act was not written to be read aloud. Professor
Countryman describes it as "combining, in an incredibly helter-skelter
fashion, the substantive rules to be applied to, and the procedure to
13. Bankruptcy Act § 34, 11 U.S.C. § 62 (1970); R. BAN. P. 901(7).
14. Herzog, Bankruptcy Tomorrow, 45 AM. BANKR. L.L 57, 58-59 (1971).
15. COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNrrED STATES, REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137,
Part I, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 34, 41, 46, 110 (1973) Illereinafter cited as COMMISsION
REPORT].
16. Shuchman, An Attempt at a "Philosophy of Bankruptcy," 21 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
403, 405-09 (1973).
17. Stone, A Primer on Bankruptcy, 16 TuL. L. REv. 339, 353-54 (1942).
18. Bankruptcy Act §§ 1-755, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1255 (1970).
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be followed in disposing of, the cases to which it applies." 19  Other
characteristics exacerbate confusion. Bankruptcy incorporates non-
bankruptcy law in an almost aleatory fashion. The Act was written
by nineteenth century legal minds; many substantive provisions are
subtle enough to delight a sophist. The main body of the Act is over
seventy-five years old; it suffers the gaps and inconsistencies to be ex-
pected after a long series of piecemeal modifications as numerous
amendments, many of them inconsistent, ill considered, and wrong-
headed, have been sewn onto the tattered garment. Because of social
and economic changes, an act designed to liquidate failed mercantile
concerns became a haven for enervated consumers. These consumers
lack assets. Thus many legitimate bankruptcy controversies are worth
too little to adjudicate. But complex procedure remains. Thus super-
fluous and futile motion dissipates resources. To the eye of uninstructed
innocence, many features appear incongruous, pehaps even incom-
patable. The present bankruptcy system, in short, is not regarded with
such wholehearted approval that discussion of alternatives is the pas-
time of an idle hour.
Time played a joke on the authors of the Bankruptcy Act. The
Act was apparently written to administer and distribute to creditors the
assets of failed businesses.20 Discharge was coupled with sanctions to
encourage the bankrupt debtor to surrender assets.21 Businesses con-
tinue to fail and to resort to bankruptcy. Mass merchandising, the con-
sumer economy, and easy consumer credit brought the consumer into
bankruptcy court. These nonbusiness bankrupts bring no or few assets
into bankruptcy court.22  For these debtors, discharge is the principal,
if not the only, goal of bankruptcy.23  Their creditors receive nothing.
The growth of consumer bankruptcy accompanied the political
rise of the common man. Through devices such as recognition of labor
unions and unemployment compensation, the politically weaker be-
came entitled to a small amount of protection against economic misfor-
tune. These measures were conscious political choices to extend to
19. Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases 1, 47 N.Y.U.L. REV.
407 (1972).
20. Olmstead, Bankruptcy, a Commercial Regulation, 15 HARv. L. REv. 829, 834
(1902).
21. Kennedy, Reflections on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States: The
Debtor's Fresh Start, 76 W. VA. L. Rnv. 427, 435 (1974).
22. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, Part I, at 2-3; D. STANLEY & M. GmRTH,
BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 20 (1971) (eighty-five percent of all bank-
ruptcies are no- or nominal-asset).
23. Kennedy, supra note 21, at 438-51.
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the working class a security which had previously been confined to the
strong. Bankruptcy must be contrasted. It was intended to benefit
the mercantile class. Consumer bankrupts adopted a mercantile insti-
tution, developed it into a haven for the lower middle class, and ex-
tended to the whole population an opportunity to discharge debts pre-
viously thought to be restricted to a minority.2 4 The bankruptcy dis-
charge developed a social welfare purpose: the fresh start.25 Except
for piecemeal modifications, however, Congress failed to alter the for-
mal institutional structure to accomodate the consumer bankrupt. This
accounts for the distinctive difficulties currently facing bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy was organized on the adversary model to resolve two
types of conflicts: bankrupt-creditor and creditor-creditor. The un-
derlying theory is creditor control: unpaid creditors will choose a vigor-
ous trustee to collect the estate, ferret out misconduct, and investigate
the bankrupt. The theory has failed.2 6 When the bankrupt lacks as-
sets to pursue and distribute, neither conflict is worth resolving. A
well advised debtor may convert all nonexempt assets into exempt as-
sets, even if it means moving to a state with more "liberal" exemption
statutes.27  Others less fortunate may be led through bankruptcy but
discover only later that they still owe their major debt.28 With some
exceptions, adversary counsel perform poorly: the Brookings study
noted that "the apathetic bungling often displayed by individual bank-
rupts' attorneys is one of the most appalling aspects of the present sys-
tem."
29
Bankruptcy was loaded with procedures which assumed adversary
interest. The adversary premise presupposes notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard. In the face of uncontested or no-asset cases, how-
ever, the adversary features only increased expense and protracted de-
lay. 0 A specialist bar prepared complicated papers for filing; candi-
dates for bankruptcy signed their names more than fifty times, twelve
of which were notarized. Trustees, attorneys, accountants, and receiv-
ers participated in the bankruptcy process. Effective management was
neglected, and paperwork proliferated.
Unanticipated consequences wrench procedure. Policymakers in-
24. D. STANLEY & M. GiRTH, supra note 22, at 42-46.
25. See Fallick v. Kehr, 369 F.2d 899, 905 (1966) (Friendly, J., dissenting).
26. D. STANLEY & M. GiRTH, supra note 22, at 87-94.
27. J. MEYERS, WIPE OUT YOUR DEBTS AND MAKE A FREsH START 125-31 (1973).
28. See, e.g., Allen v. Lindeman, 164 N.W.2d 346 (Iowa 1969).
29. D. STANLEY & M. GmTH, supra note 22, at 80.
30. Id. at 161-70.
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tend procedure to advance perceived goals. When events destroy un-
derlying premises, someone must develop either new procedures or
new reasons for the old procedures. Bankruptcy procedure must ac-
commodate two unanticipated consequences: the consumer bankrupt
and the discharge-fresh-start goal. Unanticipated consequences occur
all too often in public policy. An analogous unanticipated consequence
plagues the welfare-public assistance system. Policymakers intended
the aid-to-dependent-children program to benefit the deserving poor,
widows and orphans, and to "wither away" as coverage under other
branches of the Social Security Act expanded. Instead, the program
grew geometrically; and the recipient population became increasingly
dominated by the "undeserving poor," urban illegitimates 1
Several factors militate against change. The first is inertia. Un-
less a governmental process causes a demonstrable outrage, pressure
to change will be inadequate to overcome inertia. Mere quiet desper-
ation is insufficient. According to the Brookings study, however, pub-
lic sentiment towards bankruptcy has crossed over from quiet despera-
tion into demonstrable outrage. "Tinkering. . .will not do the job.
So widespread and so ingrained are the shortcomings of the present
system that radical rather than incremental change is necessary."82
Those employed in a system have an interest in continuing to be
employed. As Dickens pointed out:
The one great principle of English law is, to make business for
itself. There is no other principle distinctly, certainly, and con-
sistently maintained through all its narrow turnings. Viewed by this
light it becomes a coherent scheme and not the monstrous maze
the laity are apt to think it. Let them but once clearly perceive
that its grand principle is to make business for itself at their ex-
pense, and surely they will cease to grumble.83
But, in a progressive society, the foremost premise of a legal process
cannot be to generate work for itself. Present employment, however,
creates an incentive to resist change.
Hypertechnical procedure has a utilitarian advantage. It exas-
perates the person asking for relief. For example, technical pleading
rules open traps for the unwary but generally operate against plain-
tiffs." If, to discharge a debt, the bankrupt must include the creditor's
31. G. STINER, SoCIAL INSECUirI: TH-E POLITICS OF WELFARE 18-47 (1966).
32. D. STANLEY & M. GmT, supra note 22, at 198.
33. C. DiCKENS, BLEAK HousE 514 (1853).
34. See, e.g., Buckley v. Mandel Bros., 333 Iii. 368, 164 N.E. 657 (1928); Kramer
v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 311 Mo. 369, 279 S.W. 43 (1925); Oklahoma Wheat
1204 [Vol. 53
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zip code, then more debts will continue after bankruptcy. Similarly,
if exemptions must be claimed precisely, some bankrupts will lose ex-
empt property. Inevitably, creditors benefit from technicality, sloth,
or human error.
Complicated, protracted, and expensive procedures may also be
explained because they deter people from resorting to them.3" Society
imposes a stigma on the bankrupt. The person filing bankruptcy pub-
licly admits failure. If, in addition to admitting failure, the bankrupt
must face a degrading experience before discharge, then debtors will
be less likely to file bankruptcy. The discharge releases the bankrupt
from justly created debts. Society expects people to pay their debts.
The general principle is served, as Professor Stone pointed out, "by
reading to [the bankrupt] a sermon and by performing an unusual
amount of ceremony."3 6 Perhaps demeaning procedure is part of the
price society expects the bankrupt to pay for the discharge.
If the bankrupt is subject to demeaning treatment, it will probably
occur at the first meeting of creditors. While the first meeting is fre-
quently a formality and the creditors are often apathetic," an aggres-
sive creditor or referee may convert the debtor's examination into a
degradation ceremony. Professor Shuchman suggests several possible
effects: the first meeting might be a "rite of expiation" whereby the
bankrupt casts off his prior mistakes; it may also be "traumatic and
harmfur' to the sensitive.3" Shedding debts should not, it is argued,
be "perfunctory" but should be "solemn" and "serious" within the
"stark atmosphere of the courtroom" and before the "dignified de-
meanor of the Court": "[,]o Bankrupt should have the feeling that
he can divest himself of his debt without judicial review and as easily
perhaps as obtaining a Russian divorce or buying a dog license."3 9
This is an unusual premise for the adversary system. Procedure ex-
presses several ideas about people and bankruptcy: debts should be
paid; one who fails to pay debts is guilty of a moral or ethical lapse;
bankruptcy should include a stigma; before allowing people to avoid
debts, there must be a ritual; this ritual should combine admonitory with
Pool Terminal Corp. v. Rodgers, 180 Okla. 623, 70 P.2d 1080 (1937). But see Hunt
v. Wooten, 238 N.C. 42, 76 S.E.2d 326 (1953).
35. Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, 54 CAL.u. L. R.v.
1201, 1214-15 (1966).
36. Stone, supra note 17, at 361.
37. D. STANLEY & M. GmTH, supra note 22, at 76-81.
38. Shuchman, supra note 16, at 442-43.
39. Bobier, Importance of First Meeting of Creditors in Consumer Bankruptcy
Proceedings, 27 PERs. FIN. L.Q. REP. 22 (1972).
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demeaning aspects to impress the bankrupt and society that avoiding
debts is exceptional and perhaps even anti-social.40
Many characteristics of bankruptcy procedure appear to grow out
of the "stigma" of bankruptcy. 41 The bankrupt, unlike the average li-
tigant, is a mendicant who asks the government for a service. The
bankrupt may be compared, in some respects, to a welfare recipient.42
There are many historical parallels: the workhouse resembled the deb-
tor's prison; both bankrupts and paupers were compelled to wear dis-
tinctive garb: paupers wore a large "P" on their sleeves, bankrupts
wore degrading apparel. 4 But influential scholars consider bankruptcy
to be an administrative rather than a moral problem." Some scholars go
further. Professor Shuchman denies the moral-ethical basis for stigma,
stresses the possible deleterious effects of harshness, and concludes
that the bankruptcy system should be structured to facilitate easier ac-
cess to discharge. 4" The supposed social stigma has clearly declined
through the years. 46 Procedural changes may reflect this decline. If
society imposes a stigma on the bankrupt, procedural amelioration may
have little immediate effect on the stigma, except that the bankrupt
will be reminded of it less frequently.
Observers characterize the present welfare application process as
technical and demeaning; including protracted delays; requiring un-
necessary, redundant, and even impossible factual demonstration; and
violating personal dignity, self-respect, and privacy.41 Welfare appli-
cants were subjected to lie detector tests48 and surprise visits in the
middle of the night.40  Stigma has degrees. For example, a mother
explained how she lived on 216 dollars per month by pointing to low
public housing rent and subsidized food stamps, but emphasized that
she was "not on welfare."50  Welfare is the ultimate indignity. Bank-
40. Shuchman, supra note 16, at 443. See also MacLachlan, Puritanical Therapy
for Wage Earners, 68 COM. L.J. 87, 89 (1963).
41. CoMMIssiON REPORT, supra note 15, Part I, at 62.
42. Kennedy, supra note 21, at 444 (locating the geographical center of this im-
pulse in the Midwest).
43. Riesenfeld, The Evolution of Modern Bankruptcy Law, 31 MINN. L. REv. 401,
441 n.308b (1947); see 3 Pa. Stat. at L. 1712-14, ch. 237, § 2, at 224 (1896).
44. Kennedy, supra note 21, at 437.
45. Shuchman, supra note 16, at 429, 474.
46. Kennedy, supra note 21, at 428-46.
47. See generally Note, Eligibility Determinations in Public Assistance: Selected
Problems and Proposals for Reform in Pennsylvania, 115 U. PA. L. RIv. 1307 (1967).
48. County of Contra Costa v. Social Welfare Dd., 229 Cal. App. 2d 762, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 605 (Ct. App. 1964).
49. Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE L.J.
1347 (1963).
50. G. STEiNER, THE STATE OF WELFARE 4 (1971).
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ruptcy, it may be inferred, connotes less stigma than welfare, but how
much less is uncertain.
The government operates public assistance through an administra-
tive structure. Bankruptcy, by contrast, is putatively adjudicatory.
Both administrative and adjudicative systems, however, may become dis-
functional through technical procedure, conflicting policies, and legisla-
tive neglect. Thus, the Brookings study of public assistance found high
administrative cost, complexity, and inefficiency and concluded
"change in administrative organization or procedure is itself considered
progress without regard to improved tangible benefits for the recipi-
ent.' ' 51 The Brookings conclusion about the bankruptcy system is simi-
lar.52 Generalizing from public assistance, the observer may conclude
that an administrative structure may not be a complete answer to cost,
complexity, involution, and inefficiency. If society is ambivalent about
the system's goal, any process may break down.
While bankruptcy is ostensibly adjudicatory, the bankruptcy deci-
sionmaker is called "referee." The word connotes a junior judge. The
titie itself may be twisted, as by noting that "he is not wearing a striped
shirt."5  The referee is appointed by the same district judge(s) to
whom appeals lie.54 This is anomalous both for adjudicator and liti-
gant. In addition, the Act deprived the referee of some normal attri-
butes of an adjudicator. When a litigant disobeys a judge, generally
the judge may declare that litigant in contempt. 5  But the bankruptcy
referee was constrained to "certify the facts to the judge" to adjudicate
contempt."6 Finally, during the process of administering the bank-
rupts' estates, many of the referee's duties are administrative rather
than adjudicative.57  This creates two problems. First, paper process-
ing is an inefficient and uneconomical way to use expensive, legally-
trained referees.58 Secondly, when the referee participates in adminis-
tering estates and develops a relationship with the specialist bar, some
viewers question the referee's apparent impartiality to adjudicate ques-
tions about the estate.59
51. Id. at 13.
52. D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 22, at 2-4.
53. J. MEYERS, supra note 27, at 110.
54. Bankruptcy Act § 34, 39c, 11 U.S.C. H9 62, 67c (1970).
55. Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 183, 221 (1971).
56. Bankruptcy Act § 41b, 11 U.S.C. § 69b (1970).
57. COMMISSION REPORT, Part I, at 4, 81, 92-94, 104, 135-37.
58. Id. at 4.
59. Triester, Bankruptcy lurisdiction: Is It Too Summary? 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 78,
87-89 (1966). See also K. DAVIS, supra note 4, H9 13.01, .07.
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The adversary premise was instilled in the Bankruptcy Act to li-
quidate failed businesses. It is unnecessary to administer the uncon-
tested consumer bankruptcy. Creditor control foundered because
creditors lack pecuniary incentive to participate in a no-asset bank-
ruptcy. But, in addition to being needless, adversary trappings proved
to be mischievous. The Brookings study concluded that bankruptcy
is not genuinely judicial but routinely administrative and that adversary
proceedings are an expensive and time-consuming hoax.Q0
IV. THE RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE
In the fall of 1973, the new rules became effective.A1 Earlier,
the United States Supreme Court had promulgated General Orders and
Forms pursuant to section 30 of the 1898 Act."2 The orders and forms
were part of the problem of practicing under the Act. Rulemaking
was almost comatose until new enabling legislation passed Congress in
1964.3 Section 2075 delegates to the Supreme Court the power to
promulgate general procedural rules for bankruptcy and annul inconsis-
tent statutes, with the caveat that substantive rights cannot be abridged,
enlarged, or modified. This is similar to existing authority in civil, ap-
pellate, admiralty, and criminal procedure. An Advisory Committee
composed of experts and guided by an excellent reporter labored dili-
gently. The rules which govern present bankruptcy are the product
of these labors.
The drafter's dilemma is that substantive, procedural, and jurisdic-
tional provisions are inextricably and indistinguishably entangled in the
Act. In the words of Professor Kennedy, "[i]t defies the mind of man
to find rhyme or reason in the present organization of the Bank-
ruptcy Act."64  The rules supersede statutes without repealing them,
and only the "procedural" parts are superseded. The Advisory Com-
mittee's notes and careful cross-referencing assist somewhat.05 Two
questions depend on judicial decision: whether a rule supersedes a
statute, and whether a rule improperly abridges substantive rights. To
quote Professor Kennedy again: "[s]ome nice questions of construction
can and surely will arise."6' 6 Because of these problems, the present
60. D. STANLEY & M. GiRTH, supra note 22, at 197-99.
61. 411 U.S. 991 (1973).
62. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 30, 30 Stat. 544.
63. Act of Oct. 3, 1964, § 1, 78 Stat. 1001 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1970)).
64. NEw RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 8.
65. See BANxRuorcY Acr AND RULES (Collier pamphlet ed. 1975).




Act should be revised to conform to the rules and forms. This revision
would eliminate redundant, confusing, and superseded statutes and fa-
cilitate practice under the rules.
Almost universal approval greeted the rules. Because of the
sweeping nature of some of the changes contained therein, this is sur-
prising. The rules attempt to eliminate adversary attributes from
spheres which are felt to be inappropriate for such treatment and, cor-
respondingly, to increase the adversary features where appropriate.
They are divided into nine roughly chronological parts. This organiza-
tion will eliminate much index work and searching. The rules dimin-
ish the complexity of much of the language. The sentences are no
longer than necessary. The Act, in contrast, contains massive, convo-
luted walls of words which do justice to the stream of consciousness
technique at its most obscure.68  The rules contain general definitions
which govern in bankruptcy cases. Part VII accommodates the applic-
able civil rules to bankruptcy practice.6 9 The almost mandatory official
forms ° are also roughly chronological. The Advisory Committee suc-
ceeded in writing comprehensive but intelligible forms; it is now pos-
sible to study a simple bankruptcy merely by reading through the of-
ficial forms.
The practical result of these changes will be the only true test of
their effectiveness. The rules may, however, improve bankruptcy.
Simplifying changes should speed the process and reduce error. For
example, the bankrupt need only sign once; this eliminates over forty-
nine signatures. 71 Moreover, these changes should make bankruptcy
practice more accessible to the average attorney and reduce the spe-
cialist bar's monopoly. Merely by clarifying language, streamlining
procedure, and broadening access, the rules may reduce the cost of
bankruptcy and enhance the adversary system.
The rules eliminate unnecessary attributes of the adversary system
from consumer bankruptcies. When a bankrupt has no "dividends" to
distribute, creditors have responded with resounding apathy. This ef-
fectively removes eighty to ninety percent of straight bankruptcy cases
67. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 1, at 916. But see Landers, The New Bankruptcy
Rules: Relics of the Past as Fixtures of the Future, 57 MINN. L. REV. 827 (1973) (con-
centrating on the procedural-substantive distinction and criticizing the committee for
being too timid).
68. The author nominates section 67c(1), a substantive provision which, if not the
longest, is most twisted. See Bankruptcy Act § 67c(1), 11 U.S.C. § 107c(1) (1970).
69. R. BANm P. 901, 902.
70. See id. 909.
71. See id. 911 & Advisory Comm. Note.
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from the realm of creditor control and the adverary system. The bank-
rupt's only purpose is to discharge debts. The rules recognize this in
several ways.
If the bankrupt's schedules indicate too few assets to pay a divi-
dend, the creditors' notice of first meeting may tell them that proof of
claims may be omitted; if, however, assets appear later, creditors will
be given notice and allowed time to file.72 Eliminating the filing of
claims where there are no assets should cut both unnecessary paper-
work and attendance at creditors' meetings: few will attend the wake
merely to view the corpse.
The procedure to bar the bankrupt's discharge completely or to
determine whether a single debt is discharged is also accommodated
to the no- or nominal-asset case. Normally, creditors receive thirty
days notice to file a complaint to bar discharge. In a no- or nominal-
asset bankruptcy, where creditors receive notice that a dividend is not
anticipated, only ten days notice is required. 73  Normally, creditors
have between thirty to ninety days after the first meeting to file a
complaint to determine whether a particular debt is discharged. When
no dividend is anticipated, this time may be set "as early as the first
date set for the first meeting of creditors. 7 4
These expediting measures should hasten the dividendless bank-
rupt toward discharge. The bankrupt files and pays the filing fee.
The court observes no assets and sends notice to that effect to the cred-
itors. Neither proofs of claim nor objections to discharge or discharge-
ability are received. The bankrupt attends the first meeting of credi-
tors, but no creditors appear. The bankrupt is forthwith discharged. 7
To effectuate the bankrupt's discharge, creditors "are enjoined from
instituting or continuing any action or employing any process to collect
such debts .... -76 Accelerating no- or nominal-asset cases and re-
ducing unnecessary paperwork will eliminate some of the Brookings
study's major criticisms.77
When the "estate" lacks assets to administer, there is small pur-
pose in selecting a trustee except, perhaps, to draw the nominal fee. 78
72. Id. 203(b), 302(e)(4).
73. Id. 404(b).
74. Id. 409(a) (2).
75. See id. 404(d).
76. Bankruptcy Form No. 24, supra note 10. See R. BANEM. P. 404(f).
77. D. STANLEY & M. GmT, supra note 22, at 94, 171. See also R. BANKR. P.
704(a) (date for adversary trial must be set before summons served), 906(c) (reducing
time periods).
78. Bankruptcy Act § 48, 11 U.S.C. § 76c (1970).
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The rules recognize this. The judge may decline to appoint a trustee
when the only property is exempt, creditors fail to elect a trustee, and
"no other circumstances indicate the need for a trustee.179  If no trus-
tee is appointed, the judge sets the exemptions apart and files the ex-
emption report.80 This may also reduce administrative expense sub-
stantially.8"' The judge, however, is placed in an anomalous, almost
adversary posture in relation to the bankrupt.
The bankrupt's attorneys may be paid by their clients before fil-
ing. The Act displays Congress' concern with preventing attorney's
fees from devouring the estate.8 2  The bankruptcy court may invali-
date an unreasonable attorney's fee. 3 The rules advance this by com-
pelling the attorney to disclose "compensation paid or promised. ''R4
The Brookings study not only attacked the bar's bankruptcy perform-
ance,8 5 but also condemned the method of settling an attorney's com-
pensation as "a chaotic and indefensible way of setting pay for per-
formance of an important public function." '  These conclusions
emerged from practice before the rules went into effect. Lawyers'
performances may subsequently improve. It may be expecting too
much in a time of inflation but, if the rules streamline the no- or nomi-
nal-asset bankruptcy, fees may even decline.
Bankruptcy is unique; it begins only when there is simply not
enough money to pay everyone. Thus, observers lack a convenient
yardstick to measure comparable administrative costs. In about three-
fourths of the cases, the bankrupt's attorney receives the fee before
79. R. BANKR. P. 211.
80. Id. 403(d).
81. D. STANLEY & M. GmTH, supra note 22, at 190-92.
82. See Bankruptcy Act §§ 60d, 64a(1), 11 U.S.C. §§ 96d, 105a(1) (1970). See
also
"You are further to reflect, Mr. Woodcourt," becoming dignified to severity,
"that on the numerous difficulties, contingencies, masterly fictions, and forms
of procedure in this great cause, there has been expended study, ability, elo-
quence, knowledge, intellect, Mr. Woodcourt, high intellect. For many years,
the - a - I would say the flower of the bar, and the - a - I would have pre-
sume to add, the matured autumnal fruits of the Woolsack-have been
lavished upon Jarndyce and Jarndyce. If the public have the benefit, and if
the country have the adornment, of this great Grasp, it must be paid for in
money or money's worth, sir."
"Mr. Kenge," said Allan, appearing enlightened all in a moment. "Excuse
me, our time presses. Do I understand that the whole estate is found to have
been absorbed in costs?"
C. DIcKENs, supra note 33, at 803.
83. Bankruptcy Act § 60d; 11 U.S.C. § 96d (1970); R. BANmR. P. 220(a).
84. R. BANKR. P. 219(b). See also id. 107(b) (3) (bankrupt must pay filing fee
before attorney).
85. D. STANLEY & M. GmTH, supra note 22, at 80.
86. Id. at 183.
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filing; and nothing but the filing fee is available to compensate other
participants.8 7 Although precise data is hard to come by, observers
generally agree that bankruptcy costs too much. 8s Professor Landers,
however, analogizes bankruptcy to attorneys' contingency fees based on
a percentage of the amount recovered and concludes that twenty-five
percent administrative expenses are not "disproportionately high."8
Perhaps contingent fees based on "creating" a fund are an inadequate
analogy to a system which erases debts. Certainly the transaction costs,
including attorneys' fees, of the fault-based negligence system are a
major reason that reformers press for no-fault. In addition, the per-
sonal injury case is almost the archetype adversary controversy. A bet-
ter analogy to bankruptcy expense may be found in nonfault systems
which process benefits from impersonal institutions. Administrative
expenses as a proportion of net benefits in Blue Cross and Social Se-
curity are five and two percent respectively.90
Some of bankruptcy is adjudicative and adversary, some is ad-
ministrative, and some is social welfare. At a minimum it is incongru-
ous for the recipients of a social welfare service to pay cash, up-front
and in advance. 1 In light of the Committee's efforts to simplify and
expedite consumer bankruptcy, it is improper to conclude that "[tihere
is no evidence to suggest that the Advisory Committee even took note
of [widespread complaints about excessive administration expenses],
let alone attempted to do something about them. ' 92 The Committee's
response was ameliorative and incremental. The effectiveness of this
response can be determined only after its implementation and use.
The rules attempt to accommodate the perceived administrative-
adjudicative dichotomy. Parties are allowed to accede to administra-
tive processing of a simple bankruptcy. When something out of the
ordinary arises, it may be shifted to either contested98 or adversary
status.94 Except for contested involuntary petitions,9" contested mat-
ters are those where issues are insufficiently in controversy for full-
dress adversary adjudication. Contested disputes in consumer bank-
87. Id. at 190-92.
88. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, Part I, at 3.
89. Landers, supra note 67, at 868-70.
90. Conard, The Economic Treatment of Automobile Injuries, 63 MicH. L. Rnv.
279, 290 (1964).
91. But see United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
92. Landers, supra note 67, at 870.
93. R. BANKR. P. 914 & Advisory Comm. Note.
94. Id. 701.
95. Id. 104, 121.
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ruptcies will generally arise when a party objects to creditors' claims, 96
the trustee's report of exempt property,97 or the fee paid to the bank-
rupt's attorneyf 8 These disputes are routine and will generally not in-
volve large amounts, but are serious enough to summon an impartial
decisionmaker. Contested disputes are decided more informally than
adversary disputes, but notice and an opportunity to be heard are re-
quired. 99 This advances the common sense idea that some controver-
sies can be settled fairly without the time and expense consumed by
full-dress adversary proceedings.
The rules single out several bankruptcy proceedings for complete
adversary treatment. These are (1) trustee proceedings in bankruptcy
court to upset the bankrupt's transfers; (2) secured creditors', trust
beneficiaries', and bailors' proceedings to reclaim property; (3) trus-
tees' counterclaims against creditors who have filed claims; (4) trustees'
actions to recover money or property; (5) proceedings on bonds; (6)
proceedings to recover excessive dividends; (7) proceedings to deny
or revoke discharge; (8) proceedings to determine whether a particu-
lar debt is discharged; and (9) proceedings to enjoin or to be relieved
of a stay.'00 Creditors object to discharge of particular debts in about
twelve percent of all no- or nominal-asset bankruptcies.' 0 ' This will
be the adversary proceeding's primary impact.
Before the rules were adopted, adversary practice before the
referee "confronted the novice with a foreboding array of new concepts
and technicalities."' '  With the addition of the rules, adversary pro-
ceedings in bankruptcy court should be as easy for the average lawyer
as civil practice in the federal district court. When a party files an ad-
versary complaint, part VII of the rules becomes operative.'
Professor Shanker observes that "nonbankruptcy lawyers who
have practiced in the civil courts . . . may now feel more comfortable
in the bankruptcy courts than the old-line bankruptcy practitioner."' 04
The bankruptcy rules omit civil procedure rules which are irrelevant
to bankruptcy, 05 shorten some time limits to expedite the administra-




100. Id. 701 & Advisory Comm. Note.
101. Shuchman, Impact Analysis of the 1970 Bankruptcy Discharge Amendments,
51 N.C.L. REv. 233, 247-54 (1972).
102. N.Ew RuLEs OF PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 59.
103. R. BANKR. P. 703.
104. NEW RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 83-84.
105. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 71A (condemnation of property).
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tion of estates, 0 6 and change some rules to recognize jurisdictional dif-
ferences.107 Most of the civil rules apply, many being adopted by
reference. 08 While some civil rules are found outside part VII, 10 the
rules in part VII are numbered to correspond to the civil rules. This
should heighten the adversary aspects of fully contested controversies.
Commensurate with the Committee's effort to separate adminis-
trative and adjudicative aspects of bankruptcy proceedings, the rules
attempt to enhance the adjudicator's "image." The Act defines judge
as "a judge of a court of bankruptcy, not including the referee." 110
The referee's position was ambivalent; referee's duties ranged from the
clerical (countersigning checks)"' to supervising the trustee and pass-
ing on disputed matters as adjudicator. Even as adjudicator, the
referee was junior. Interlocutory appeals were available by right, and
the district judge could take additional evidence on appeal." 2 There
were few appeals, however; the referee had the final say on almost all
bankruptcy matters." 3
The rules emphasize the judicial and de-emphasize the clerical-
ministerial attributes of the office. The referee, for example, may
delegate ministerial duties,114 is relieved from countersigning checks," 85
and need not pass on proved but unobjected-to claims."16 The rules
also elevate the referee's adjudicatory role. First, there is a new title
-"bankruptcy judge"-which means either the referee or the district
judge. 17  It is often necessary to distinguish between the district judge
and the referee."" In the usual course of a bankruptcy, the former
referee is now bankruptcy judge. The bankruptcy judge may conduct
jury trials." 9 Moreover, when the district judge reviews the bank-
ruptcy judge, review is on the evidentary record made before the
bankruptcy judge, 20 and the bankruptcy judge's findings of fact must
106. Compare R. BANER. P. 712, Advisory Comm. Note, with FED. R. Civ. P. 12.
107. See, e.g., R. BANxR. P. 708.
108. See, e.g., id. 726.
109. See, e.g., id. 911 (FED. R. COv. P. 11).
110. Bankruptcy Act § 1(20), 11 U.S.C. § 1(20) (1970); cf. id. § 1(9), 11 U.S.C.
§ 1 (9) (referee defined as court).
111. R. BANKR. P. 605(c).
112. Id. 810; cf. id. 752(a).
113. D. STANLEY & M. GmTH, supra note 22, at 155-58.
114. R. BANKR. P. 506.
115. Id. 605(c) & Advisory Comm. Note.
116. Id. 306.
117. Id. 901(7).





be affirmed unless clearly erroneous. 21  Thus, from a clerk-master in
chancery-permanent receiver, the Advisory Committee created a full-
fledged judge.
Perhaps the most controversial of the rules is that which confers
the contempt power on the referee.12 1 Previously, all bankruptcy con-
tempts were certified to the district judge. The referee now possesses
power to punish in-court misbehavior' 2 and out-of-court disobedi-
ence, 2 4 to impose civil contempt for failure to respond to discovery or-
ders, 125 and to utilize coercive contempt to advance remedial goals. 126
The rule limits the referee to a sanction of 250 dollars. 2 7  If the con-
tempt merits imprisonment or a fine larger than 250 dollars, the re-
feree certifies it to the district judge.' 2s
The question which will be raised is whether this rule modifies
substantive rights and violates the Enabling Act.12 9  It is facile to de-
cide this important issue on a meaningless conclusion like whether the
contempt power is "inherent."' 30  As Professor Dobbs makes clear in
his groundbreaking article, contempt is one of the last wild cards in
the legal deck.' 3' Some form of contempt power is thought to be
necessary to allow a court to carry on the practical business of adjudi-
cating disputes.'" 2 So long as state courts of limited jurisdiction possess
the contempt power, no one should object to a bankruptcy judge im-
posing a fine of 250 dollars. The amount is not large. 3 3  The rules
121. Id. 752(a), 810.
122. Bankruptcy Rules and Official Bankruptcy Forms, 411 U.S. 991, 992-94
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
123. R. BArnR. P. 920(a)(1).
124. Id. 920(a)(2).
125. Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 737 adopts Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
37(b) (1) which provides for civil contempt under certain circumstances.
126. See R. BANKR. P. 770.
127. Id. 920(a) (3).
128. Id. 920(a) (4).
129. See 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1970); NEw RuLEs oF PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at
118-20.
130. See R. BAxRx. P. 920, Advisory Comm. Note; Landers, supra note 67, at 865-
67. But cf. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 196 n.1 (1968); Michaelson v. United
States, 266 U.S. 42, 65-67 (1924).
131. Dobbs, supra note 55, at 282-84. See also Bankruptcy Rules & Official Bank-
ruptcy Forms, 411 U.S. 989, 992-94 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
132. United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 510 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 979 (1973).
133. Compare Landers, supra note 67, at 867 ("minimal") with Katcher, Contested
Matters, in NEW RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 120 ("there is nothing minor
about a $250 fine, even in this era of inflation."). The major-minor line for jury trial
of contempts is drawn at six months confinement, which makes a $250 fine pretty minor
in comparison. See Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974).
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require a reasonably protective procedure. 134 Finally, when personali-
ties are involved, the aggrieved referee is disqualified. 3 " Recent con-
tempt decisions dilute formerly unconstrained contempt power.180
When these decisions are considered, it must be concluded that draconian
contempt powers are not a vital attribute of a functioning adjudicator.
The bankruptcy judge's contempt power is a reasonably necessary and
reasonably circumscribed device to maintain the court's dignity and to
insure its practical functioning.137 Professor Landers overstates the
case by asserting that the contempt rule is "the 'fudge' method," that
"it makes no sense in light of other pronouncements .. . about in-
creasing the prestige and dignity of the bankruptcy court," and that
"while the committee was quick and eager to bestow the title [of judge]
they were obviously hesitant to confer the power which normally ac-
companies it."' 8
The bankruptcy judge continues, under the rules, to oversee the
trustee who administers the bankrupt's estate.'8 9 This will make no
difference in the large majority of bankruptcies without assets to ad-
minister. Where there are assets, this administrative role may de-
tract from the. judge's apparent impartiality. There is no parallel in
the adversary model. Trial judges hear contested discovery matters, 140
often conduct pretrial hearings,' 4' and later preside over trials. Unlike
the first meeting of creditors and the estate management, these pro-
cedures are seldom ex parte. Most litigation, however, lacks an exist-
ing fund; and someone must look out for the estate's general interest.
While the adversary model is a powerful analogy, it cannot govern the
way all disputes are resolved. There must be some compromises with
bankruptcy's institutional and practical exigencies. Other models, such
as the decedent's estate, should be compared. One additional fact
must be considered: there was not enough to go around before bank-
ruptcy was filed. Thus economy, efficiency, and expertise should be
considered in addition to the appearance of fairness.
134. The procedure is based on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42, see R.
BArmaR. P. 920, Advisory Comm. Note.
135. Id. 920(a)(2). See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
136. Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S.
488 (1974); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971); Bloom v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 194 (1968).
137. See, e.g., Menard v. Aldens (E.D. Tenn.) (unreported), digested in 48 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 184 (1974).
138. Landers, supra note 67, at 867.
139. Id. at 865, 867.





Professor Landers concludes that some of the rules' changes are
"cosmetic."' 4 2 There are changes, however, both functional and sym-
bolic. Many of the functional changes were designed to facilitate and
expedite the consumer bankruptcy. The questions are (1) whether
the Advisory Committee clearly distinguished the administrative from
the contested and adjudicative aspects of the proceedings, (2) whether
the administrative is expeditious and inexpensive, and (3) whether the
adjudicative is satisfactorily adversary. The symbolic changes cannot
be so quickly dismissed as cosmetic. The bankruptcy process includes
many symbols: the wonderful wizard waves a wand and the debts dis-
appear.143 Many characteristics of adversary adjudication, such as ju-
dicial robes and "oyez," cannot be explained except as tradition and
ritual. These symbols celebrate the model of the adversary adjudica-
tor, the impartial and wise person who will concentrate upon a discrete
and personal dispute. The Committee's efforts to move the bankruptcy
adjudicator in the direction of the adversary adjudicator by conferring
upon the former the adversary adjudicator's outward attributes should
not be condemned without considering the full value of symbolism in
the judicial process.
The rules retain the adversary system's basic premises: party
prosecution, party presentation, and an impartial decisiomnaker. Thus
the bankrupt will receive no better services than the bar provides.
Some bankruptcy judges will suggest converting a hopeless Chapter
XII to straight bankruptcy. But the judge cannot correct a foolish
mistake. The bankrupt may lose all section 70a property, be dis-
charged from a few minor debts, and emerge from bankruptcy con-
tinuing to owe a major debt. 44 The adversary system presupposes
knowledgeable advocates; unless such advocates exist, the system can-
not function.
V. PROCEDURE UNDER THE PROPOSED ACT
The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws' two-part report was of-
ficially transmitted in mid-1973 and released to the public soon there-
after. Part I includes twelve chapters about the present bankruptcy
system and the proposed changes. Part II contains the Proposed Act
together with comprehensive notes, commentary, and citations to rele-
142. Landers, supra note 67, at 839.
143. D. EARL, "rTn BAxRauPmNs (1966) (Harry and the Wonderful Wizard of
Laws).
144. Allen v. Lindeman, 164 N.W.2d 346 (Iowa 1969).
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vant legal sources. The proposed revision is coherent and comprehen-
sive, a code rather than an agglomeration of statutes.
The Commission's most sweeping recommendation is to create an
independent executive agency called the "United States Bankruptcy
Administration."' '45 A presidential appointee called the Administra-
tor will head the Administration. 146 Regional offices staffed under the
civil service system will be established. 47 Bankruptcy will be or-
ganized around the Administration. Except for a few cases, the Ad-
ministration will serve as counselor to the debtor-bankrupt,14 8 clerk,1'0
trustee,6 0 and adjudicator.' 5'
A new bankruptcy court will be created.' 2 The Commission re-
jected the Brookings recommendation that bankruptcy be handled ex-
clusively within an agency by an internal hearing-appeals process.1 3
Bankruptcy court judges will be appointed by the President, confirmed
by the Senate, and will serve fifteen-year terms.' 54  Filing, record
keeping, and supervision of trustees wil be performed by the Ad-
ministrator. The bankruptcy judge will possess only adjudicatory func-
tions: deciding contested involuntary petitions,'55 determining dis-
charges, 56 and passing on objected-to claims.' 57 While the Proposed
Act contracts the court's administrative functions, it enlarges the
court's adjudicative power. It abolishes the troublesome plenary-sum-
mary dichotomy and extends jurisdiction to "all controversies arising
out of any bankruptcy"'5 8 including "controversies involving property
of the estate of the debtor,"'15 9 and actions to upset transfers and pay-
ments. 60 The bankruptcy court will also possess jurisdiction over the
bankrupt's exempt property."' Finally, the court will have full con-
145. Proposed Act § 3-101, set forth in COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, Part
11 [hereinafter cited as Proposed Act].
146. See id. § 3-102(a).
147. Id. §§ 3-102(c)-(d) (professionals "as needed" without regard to civil serv-
ice).
148. Id. § 4-203(a).
149. See id. §§ 4-202(b), -207(b) to (c), -307.
150. See id. §§ 3-202(b)(5), 5-101(c). But see id. §§ 5-101(a), 6-101.
151. Id. §§ 4-101, -311, -402(a), 6-204(b).
152. Id. § 2-101.
153. COMMIsSION REPORT, supra note 15, Part I, at 86-88.
154. Proposed Act §§ 2-102(a)-(b).
155. Id. §§ 2-207, 4-207(c).
156. Id. § 4-505(c).
157. Id. § 4-402.
158. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, Part I, at 89-91.
159. Proposed Act § 2-201 (a) (5).
160. Id. § 2-201(a)(7).
161. Id. § 2-201(a)(2).
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tempt power. 162 This restructuring, the Commission asserts, will sub-
stantially reduce the number of bankruptcy judges. 63
The Commission's report and the Proposed Act have, even in
their short life, been criticized. Some critics direct attention to the
composition of the Commission. Mr. Phelan observes that the Com-
mission was preoccupied with consumer bankruptcies because the busi-
ness bankruptcy community was not represented: "no full-time prac-
ticing business bankruptcy attorney or bankruptcy judge was appointed
to the Commission."'" 4  Instead, there is a "theoretical and academic
approach," apparently because of "the overwhelming preponderance of
professors and teachers to the near exclusion of practitioners."' 5
Judge Cyr perceives the matter differently. He notes that "the
Commission did not number among its members a single individual
with substantial experience in consumer bankruptcy administration or
practice."'1 16 Judge Cyr concludes that the Commission missed the
mark in consumer bankruptcy because of "preeminent concern, . . .
entirely understandable . . . given the interests and backgrounds of its
members, with the problems of business bankruptcy and reorganization
law."' 7 Both Judge Cyr and Mr. Phelan oppose the proposed Bank-
ruptcy Administration. 68
The candid and detached observer is hard put to identify the
Commission members as either bleeding-heart liberal saps or flint-eyed
business community lackeys. Nor can it be reasonably asserted that
the Commission was either captured by or co-opted to fuzzy-minded
academics. While the Commission's work cannot be uniformly com-
mended, critics should address the merits of the particular proposals
and the premises which underlie them.
Procedure under the Proposed Act is difficult to assess. The Pro-
posed Act restructures bankruptcy without providing procedure. In
many instances, it anticipates that the Administrator will formulate pro-
cedure.' 69 For example, the Act leaves the form of voluntary petition
162. Id. § 2-201(d).
163. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, Part I, at 6, 95, 136 (projecting a fifty
percent reduction).
164. Phelan, The Proposed Bankruptcy Administration (The "FBA")-Bureaucratic
Alphabet Soup Gets a Bigger Bowl, 48 AM. BAN.R. L.J. 341, 342 (1974).
165. Id. at 343.
166. Cyr, The Bankruptcy Act of 1973: Back to the Drafting Board, 48 AM.
BAKRa. L.J 45, 46 (1974).
167. Id. at 52.
168. Id. at 55; Phelan, supra note 164, at 343.
169. Proposed Act § 3-302(b).
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to the Administrator,'170 who may follow the present rules.171 Until
Congress passes the Act, the President selects an Administrator and
the Administrator promulgates rules, procedure will be uncertain. By
leaving procedure open, the Commission exposed itself to criticism for
peddling the proverbial "pig in a poke. '1 7 2
Professor Landers, writing before the Commission's report ap-
peared, criticized this procedural vacuum. He speculated about the re-
lationship between the Rules Committee and the Bankruptcy Commis-
sion,173 concluded that the rules are "relics," and feared that the Com-
mission might defer to the rules. This would embalm these "relics of
the past" as legislation where they will become "fixtures of the future."
"It would be unfortunate," Professor Landers states, "if the Advisory
Committee passed the ball to the Commission on the ground of lack
of power, only to find that the Commission decided to accept the Ad-
visory Committee's work. .. .
Judge Cyr asserts similar points for different reasons. His view
is that the Brookings study was promulgated without considering the
salutary effect of the new rules.175 Criticism of the bankruptcy system
should, therefore, be delayed until the rules can be observed in opera-
tion. Since "bankruptcy is at least ninety percent procedural," 170 pro-
cedural flexibility and step by step reform will be attained if a pro-
cedural advisory committee monitors procedure in a careful and on-
going fashion.'7 7 At the same time, the Commission should be content
to complete only substantive reform. 78 Thus, Judge Cyr hopes and
Professor Landers fears that the Commission and the Advisory Com-
mittee will unite their efforts to achieve incremental reform.
The Advisory Committee and the Bankruptcy Commission are re-
lated; however, personnel overlaps somewhat. For example, Profes-
sor Kennedy was Reporter to the Rules Advisory Committee and Ex-
ecutive Director of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws. It was not
clear to Professor Landers whether the rules were the procedural step
170. Id. § 4-202(a). See also id. § 4-307, Advisory Comm. Note (mode of written
notice to be determined by Administrator's rules).
171. Id. § 3-202(b) (1), Advisory Comm. Note 4.
172. Cyr, supra note 166, at 67.
173. Landers, supra note 67, at 836-38.
174. Id. at 838.
175. Cyr, supra note 166, at 51.
176. Id. at 67.
177. Id. at 60 n.53.
178. Cyr, The Abandonment of Judicial Administration of Insolvency Proceedings:
A Commitment to Consumer Disservice, 78 CoM. L.J. 37, 38 (1973).
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which would be completed by the Commission's proposed legislation,
the substantive step.'79 After the Commission report, the relation re-
mains "cryptic." The Proposed Act continues to present rulemaking
process.' The Proposed Act also creates an Administration'"' and
delegates power to that office to "adopt, amend, and repeal" rules.'8 2
The Commission expects "that the administrator will find it efficient
and appropriate to coordinate his rulemaking with that of the Supreme
Court for the bankruptcy courts insofar as related subject matter calls
for compatible rules.' 83
A panel of distinguished bankruptcy experts responded to ques-
tions at a continuing legal education seminar. 8 4  One question was
whether the rules would be substantially revised after the Proposed Act
passed. The anonymous answerer mentioned some changes: under
the Proposed Act, judicial and administrative matters will be separated
and the administrative assigned to a new agency. Cases formerly de-
cided in plenary proceedings outside bankruptcy court will be adjudi-
cated in bankruptcy court. Hence "[c]ertainly, there will have to be
a considerable number of changes in the Bankruptcy Rules.' 85  On
the other hand, there are some continuities. "To a very considerable
extent, the draftsmanship of the [proposed] Bankruptcy Act assumes
a continuation of these rules or procedure. . . . [Ihe draftsmen
of the act assumed that the formulation and promulgation of procedural
rules will be governed by the same process that now applies. The Pro-
posed Act contains little in the way of procedural rules.""' This is
a good summary, but it leaves the observer as uncertain as he was be-
fore.
The Proposed Act continues some procedural trends begun by the
rules. It includes the rules' features that expedite consumer bankrupt-
cies. When the bankrupt's schedules reveal that there are no assets to
distribute, the notice to creditors informs them that proof of claims is
unnecessary.8 7 But the bankrupt must disclose property and turn it
over to the administrator. 88 If it seems likely that there will be assets
179. Landers, supra note 67, at 837 n.29.
180. Proposed Act § 2-204(a).
181. Id. § 3-102(a).
182. Id. § 3-202(b) (1).
183. Id. § 3-202, Advisory Comm. Note 4.
184. Including Vern Countryman, Frank 1. Kennedy, and Lawrence P. King. See
NEw RuLEs OF PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 191.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Proposed Act § 4-307(a) (4); R. BAKR. P. 203(b).
188. Proposed Act § 4-502; cf. R. BAN. P. 108(e), 402.
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to distribute, creditors may be sent notice to file claims.18 0 This small
continuation from the rules will assist in reducing unnecessary mailing
and filing.
The rules provide that the filing of a petition operates automati-
cally to stay certain forms of creditor conduct.10 This is based on the
policy of protecting the bankrupt against creditor tactics which circum-
vent the discharge.101 Under the present Act, this stay may have un-
intended consequences. In Chapter XIII, the statutory standard for
a stay of lien enforcement was characterized by flexibility, 0 2 in part
because secured creditors who were "dealt with" by the plan might
veto. 0 3 Secured creditors, who are now automatically prevented from
enforcing liens,0 4 may argue successfully that they are "dealt with" and
may veto. The Proposed Act continues the automatic stay;' how-
ever, it obviates the perceived difficulty by eliminating the secured
creditors' veto.'90 This combines procedural and substantive change
better to accomplish bankruptcy's protective function.
The initial notice to creditors will no longer inform them that
there will be a first meeting of creditors. 7 Any party or the Ad-
ministration may apply to examine the debtor.0 8  Thus, the Proposed
Act eliminates the first meeting and replaces it with an optional exami-
nation. 0 9 From the standpoint of the adversary system, no great loss
will occur, since creditors' apathy has already reduced the first meeting
to a sham.200 When there is no controversy, adversary procedure may
be unnecessary. Making the examination optional is commensurate
with the Commission's pragmatic conclusion that consumer bankruptcy
is purely an administrative matter. If the first meeting possesses sym-
bolic or ritual functions, 20' these functions will be, for the most part,
eliminated.
The Proposed Act clearly continues a trend, begun under the
189. Proposed Act § 4-401(a); R. BANKR. P. 203(b).
190. R. BANKR. P. 401, 601, 13-401.
191. Id. 401, Advisory Comm. Note. But cf. Landers, supra note 67, at 875.
192. Bankruptcy Act § 614, 11 U.S.C. § 1014 (1970); Hallenback v. Penn Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566, 572 (4th Cir. 1963).
193. Bankruptcy Act § 652, 11 U.S.C. § 1052 (1970).
194. R. BANKR. P. 13-401(a).
195. Proposed Act § 4-501(a) (1).
196. Id. § 6-204(b).
197. Id. § 4-307.
198. Id. § 3-410.
199. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, Part I, at 121.
200. D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 22, at 21-22, 76-77.
201. See text accompanying notes 35-42 supra; cf. Cyr, supra note 166, at 51;
Shuchman, supra note 16, at 443.
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rules, to create a more judicial bankruptcy judge. Today the bank-
ruptcy judge-referee receives petitions, issues notice, presides at the
first meeting of creditors, supervises the trustee in collecting the estate,
allows exemptions and claims, and grants discharges. The Commission
seeks to sever administrative from adjudicative functions to allow judges
to judge and administrators to administer. 2 2 Administration, it is said,
will be flexible, uniform, and economical; adversary controversies will
occur less frequently and be less costly; and adjudication will be impar-
tial, expert, and speedy.20 3 Many functions formerly performed by the
referee will be delegated to the Administrator and his staff;20 4 many
bankruptcy referees will be out of a job.20 5
An additional reason to give administrative functions to the new
agency is the appearance of doing justice. The referee presides over
and participates in nonadversary proceedings. Information accumu-
lated in nonadversary proceedings may, the Commission fears, influ-
ence decisions in adversary proceedings. More particularly, the re-
feree appoints or approves a trustee, and supervises the collection of
the estate. Especially where a specialist bar exists, "the referee may
not appear to the trustee's adversary as one fitting the model of judicial
objectivity." 26 The Commission concludes that "making an individual
responsible for conduct of both administrative and judicial aspects of
a bankruptcy case is incompatible with the proper performance of the
judicial function," and recommends that "bankruptcy judges be re-
moved from the administration of bankrupt estates and be restricted
to the performance of essentially judicial functions. ' 20 T
Two comments are in order. First, unseemly trustee-referee re-
lationships are possible only when the bankrupt owns significant assets.
In about ninety percent of all bankruptcies, there are only nominal as-
sets, if any. The present rules allow the court to dispense with a trus-
tee in these bankruptcies. 08 Secondly, in addition to separating judi-
cial and administrative functions, the Proposed Act allows the agency
to perform as trustee in most bankruptcies 0 9 and eliminates the auto-
matic first meeting of creditors.21 0 This changes the corespondent in
202. COMMISSION REPoRT, supra note 15, Part I, at 94-96.
203. Id. at 81-82.
204. Id. at 120-26.
205. Id. at 95, 136 (estimating a fifty percent reduction).
206. Id. at 93.
207. Id. at 93-94.
208. R. BAlR. P. 211.
209. Proposed Act § 5-101.
210. Id. § 4-310.
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the indecorous relationship and reduces the opportuinty for ex parte
knowledge. Thus it may be concluded that the administrator-adjudi-
cator problem is inflated, that the rules in some ways obviate the prob-
lem, and that other parts of the Proposed Act also confront the prob-
lem.
If the present system may be criticized for combining functions,
then the proposed agency should be examined to determine whether
the new combination satisfies the criticism. Changes in organization
cannot alter human nature, and problems growing out of combined
functions plague all administrative agencies.2 11 Under the Commis-
sion's recommendations, the Bankruptcy Administration will administer
bankrupt estates. Judge Cyr argues that the Bankruptcy Administra-
tion, "created principally to eliminate real and apparent conflicts on the
part of the bankruptcy court, would become an executive compendium
of conflicting interests, powers, and responsibilities." '212 The Adminis-
trator's powers begin with rulemaking213 and fee setting.214 When the
agency's services are sought, someone in the agency counsels debtors
with regular income.21 '5 The agency receives petitions, 10 sends no-
tice,2 1 7 often serves as trustee, 218 receives claims, objects to claims, sus-
tains or overrules objections to claims, 21 9 and orders payments to credi-
tors.220 While administering the estate, the agency may issue a sub-
poena and examine any person,22' pass on the conduct of prebank-
ruptcy custodians, 222 appoint creditors' committees, 223 assume or reject
executory contracts, 2 4 and compromise claims or actions against the
estate.225 In dealing with the bankrupt, the agency appraises assets,
allows or disallows exemptions,2 26 passes on prebankruptcy payments
to attorneys,2 27 and objects to discharge.228  Aside from matters specif-
211. K. DAvis, supra note 4, § 13.01.
212. Cyr, supra note 166, at 63-64.
213. Proposed Act § 3-202(a) (1).
214. Id. § 3-302(b).
215. Id. § 4-203(a).
216. Id. § 4-202(b).
217. Id. § 4-307.
218. Id. § 5-101(c).
219. Id. §§ 4-401 to -402.
220. Id. § 4-405.
221. Id. §§ 4-310(a) to (c).
222. Id. § 4-603(c).
223. Id. § 5-102(a).
224. Id. § 4-602.
225. Id. § 3-202(b)(5).
226. Id. § 4-503(j).
227. Id. § 4-311.
228. Id. § 4-505(b).
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ically excepted, the agency "shall act on all matters that arise" with
a limited right of appeal to the bankruptcy court.229
To avoid the charge of functional incompatibility, some reshuffling
may be necessary.230 For example, agency personnel consult with the
debtor. Full disclosure is necessary to insure good advice. The adver-
sary model assumes that the client will disclose to an advocate who will
represent that client as fully as the law allows. In consumer bankrupt-
cies, however, the Commission assumes that the debtor may dispense
with a privately retained attorney and rely on the agency's personnel
for advice.231 Following agency counseling, the debtor decides the ul-
timate remedy. 2  After the debtor files a petition, someone in the
agency may object to discharge. In addition, communications during
this counseling process are not privileged, and the agency may later
subpoena the debtor or any other person to testify under oath. Would
a well-advised debtor, knowing all this, disclose fully? The agency's
role appears to be ambulatory, shifting from debtor's helper to bank-
rupt's adversary. When the observer considers the agglomeration of
agency functions, the nascent conflict built into some of these functions,
and the radical departure from the adversary model, he must question
whether the proposed Administration is truly propitious.
Administrative agencies may bring several healthy characteristics
to bear on social problems. Agencies may be quick, inexpensive, and
expert. It is difficult to imagine an agency employee telling a debtor
who owes a 20,000 dollar judgment for alienation of affections that he
should seek a bankruptcy discharge.233 Skeptics, however, may point
to particular instances of expensive, bumbling, and surly bureaucracies.
From the Circumlocution Office in Dickens' Little Dorritt, with its
motto "[h]ow not to do it,"234 to the contemporary Peter Principle that
"[iln a hierarchy every employee tends to rise to his level of incompe-
tence,"23z governmental operatives have been frequently, and often
justifiably, ridiculed. Judge Cyr maintains that incremental reform
through judicial reorganization and delegation of administrative tasks
to clerical personnel will avoid bureaucratic problems.23
6
229. Id. § 4-101(a).
230. Lee, supra note 1, at 934.
231. CoMMIssIoN REPORT, supra note 15, Part I, at 160.
232. Proposed Act § 4-203(b).
233. Alien v. Lindeman, 164 N.W.2d 346 (Iowa 1969); see Proposed Act § 4-506
(a) (7).
234. See generally C. DICKENS, LirriE DoRRrrT (1857).
235. L. PETER, THE PETER PREscRIPToN 11 (1972).
236. Cyr, supra note 166, at 58-59. See also Lee, supra note 1, at 934.
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Those who believe with Professor Thode that "justice is best served
in the long run by operation of the system according to authoritative
rules, including legally binding ethical standards for advocates, who are
vital cogs in the system ''11 will mourn when an adversary process is
converted to an administrative one. Agency decisions which empha-
size discretion and de-emphasize adversary participation are felt to be
less legitimate and to possess less moral force than court decisions.238
The central problem in bankruptcy reform, however, is what to do with
an imperfect adversary system. Although a well-informed attorney can
give good remedial advice to a debtor, 39 several factors militate against
this: bankruptcy is complex, almost beyond understanding; bank-
ruptcy has a disreputable ambiance, and many lawyers disdain it; and
consumer bankruptcy neither produces nor generates a fee. However,
even a disfunctional adversary system may have valuable attributes.
Procedural and substantive changes may simplify bankruptcy. Law
schools and continuing legal education may educate the bar. Legal
specialization may develop. The Commission apparently considered
these alternatives but recommended a new agency. At this writing,
the race between privately retained advocates and agency expertise has
been won by the agency.
Commentators have long felt that there is less that is traditionally
legal in consumer bankruptcy than meets the eye. One way to express
this is to say that the adversary model is unsuitable. Another way is
to say that consumer bankruptcy is a social or sociological problem rath-
er than a legal problem.240 If consumer bankruptcies are conceived
as sociological, consumer bankrupts may be perceived as a social wel-
fare problem.
From the conclusions that the adversary system had failed and that
bankruptcy was properly an administrative process, the Brookings study
reasoned that an agency should provide financial counseling. An
agency representative would analyze the debtor's financial status, and
explain the advantages and disadvantages of available remedies. If the
debtor chose bankruptcy, the agency would continue to provide finan-
cial counseling.24' Other commentators observe that without debt or
237. Thode, supra note 3, at 589-92.
238. Cf. id. at 589.
239. See, e.g., Wickham, Bankruptcy or not? Advice for Attorneys Who Counsel
Consumer Debtors, 41 TENN. L. REv. 667 (1974).
240. S. RUTBERG, TEN CENTS ON THE DOLLAR: THE BANKRUPTCY GAME 128
(1973); Coogan, The Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973: Questions for the Non-Bank-
ruptcy Business Lawyer, 29 Bus. LAwYER 729, 733 (1974).
241. D. STANLEY & M. GiRTH, supra note 22, at 5, 204-05.
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budget counseling, the discharge's fresh start goal may be frustrated. 242
The Commission's conclusions differ slightly. The Proposed Act
provides that agency personnel "shall counser' individual debtors with
"regular income. '2 43  This appears to advance two interests. First, the
Commission observed that fewer people avail themselves of wage
earner plans than might. Seeking to foster and encourage these plans
without making them compulsory, the Commission concluded that an
agency should tell debtors about composition, extension, and straight
bankruptcy. The fully informed debtor will then choose rationally. 2
4
This contains a concealed premise: the adversary system is faulty.
Neither private attorneys nor referees explain all alternatives to debt-
ors. The Commission anticipates that debtors may dispense with pri-
vately retained lawyers and that agency personnel will assume a more
activist or inquisitorial stance than that of impartial adjudicator. 45
Thus, the agency will extend legal-financial advice to the debtor. This,
coupled with substantive changes,2 46 will lead to a more meaningful
fresh start.
The second reason the Commission recommends counseling ap-
pears to grow out of the Commission's ideas of the causes of bank-
ruptcy and to involve basic ideas about bankruptcy, the economy, and
the relationsip between citizen and government. It appears to be dis-
tinctly related to bankruptcy's social welfare purpose. The Commis-
sion Report's chapter entitled "A Philosophical Basis for a Federal
Bankruptcy Act ' 2 47 seems, on first reading, to be less of a philosophy
than a series of excuses for doing without one. The philosophy is, per-
force, capitalistic; if also assumes mass consumption of goods and ser-
vices based on readily available credit. People should pay their just
debts, but not always. When debtors cannot pay, a bankruptcy dis-
charge will wipe the slate clean.
The Commission expresses its philosophy, justifies bankruptcy,
and relates bankruptcy to the debt-paying credit economy with one
phrase: "debtors with 'fresh starts' are better enabled to participate
in the credit economy."248 The report states "it is fitting that the
bankruptcy process afford . . . diagnostic services that identify the
242. Herzog, supra note 14, at 60-61; Landers, supra note 67, at 877.
243. Proposed Act § 4-203. See id. § 1-102(28).
244. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, Part I, at 159-60.
245. Id. at 160.
246. See, e.g., Proposed Act §§ 4-503 (uniform exemptions), -507(a) (banning
post-bankruptcy reaffirmation of discharged debt).
247. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, Part I, at 61-84.
248. Id. at 68.
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causes of financial difficulty, counseling that improves the debtor's...
capabilities as a participant in the open credit economy, and referrals
to . other agencies equally but differently specialized, for example,
family counseling agencies and mental health clinics. 249  Counseling,
therefore, should "help the debtor acquire greater skill and knowledge
as a participant in the open consumer credit economy" and "alert him
about sources of assistance in his community for dealing with nonfinan-
cial problems, e.g., illness or marital difficulty, that have had or threaten
adverse economic consequences. 2 n°
Earlier discussion supposed that agency advice would be financial.
The preceding, however, connotes more lifestyle than budgetary ad-
vice. The Commission assumes that the counselors will be nonlaw-
yers.251 When computing expense, the Commission used "an average
of four hours" counseling in each case.25 2 Because the Commission
concludes that privately retained attorneys will be unnecessary, 25 3 the
total cost to society may not rise. 4 Moreover, the Commission sug-
gests that the general benefit of counseling may be substantial enough
to warrant support from general revenues. 255 Thus, a social worker
paid by the taxpayer may replace the privately retained attorney.
The Commission recommendation to extend counseling to life-
style appears to be based on the notion that personal inadequacy leads
to bankruptcy. While mentioning the complex of legal, economic, and
intangible causes, the report focuses on individual deficiencies. The
report quotes a study which concluded that a group of bankrupts had
a tendency toward emotional immaturity and ...they were lack-
ing in frustration tolerance. They were evasive, worrying, and
easily annoyed. They tended to be shy, withdrawing, cautious, and
retiring.. . . They were identified as a group that was unable
to keep in contact with all that was going on around them. The
group was described as one that lacked will control and character
stability. They were also found to be tense, excitable, restless,
fretful, and impatient.256
Further on, and in the report's own words:
The higher incidence of marital difficulties and other family
problems among financially burdened debtors than among the
249. Id. at 74.
250. Id. at 79.
251. Id. at 122.
252. Id. at 139.
253. Id. at 160.
254. Id. at 139.
255. Id. at 150.
256. Id. at 48.
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general population; the employment, rehabilitation, and other non-
financial difficulties stemming from accident and illness; and the
personality inadequacies that lead to irrational spending, compul-
sive gambling, drunkenness, and other excesses all suggest that
many bankrupts may benefit from specialized counseling and treat-
ment service beyond the scope of budget counseling.257
Thus "the primary responsibility for reducing the causes of bankruptcy
lies with the individual and the primary social responsibility lies in the
assistance of education, counseling, and professional treatment of per-
sonality or character inadequacies. 26 8
While in the abstract the report hesitates to label or blame,2 19 the
report's practical focus adopts what the abstract statement eschews.
Bankruptcy will not be a dehumanizing, impersonal bureaucracy. In-
stead, bankruptcy will be a center to treat consumer maladies and to
refer elsewhere for more extensive therapy. The consumer economy's
walking wounded will stagger into bankruptcy from whence they will
emerge healed, hearty, and ready to consume again. The conclusion
that the adversary model is incongruous in consumer bankruptcy does
not compel a second conclusion that consumer bankruptcy is a social
welfare problem instead of a legal problem. Indeed, the Commission's
proposals extend consumer bankruptcy beyond the adversary model,
beyond the inquisitorial-administrative model, and into the realm of the
social welfare or therapeutic state.
We know only a little about the consumers who arz caught up in
bankruptcy. The studies, Professor Shuchman observes, are based on
data which "seems, variously, poorly gathered, fragmented, incomplete,
and not addressed to the problems that would help us to formulate a
philosophy of bankruptcy."2 60 The Commission Report admits as
much.2 6 ' In addition, social science failed to analyze an important con-
trol group, the "insolvent" consumers who abstain from bankruptcy.
26 2
Social scientists bring their attitudes to their studies .2  They
may define social problems as personal or political. When problems
are defined as political, the social scientist's task may be over. Defin-
ing problems as personal opens a new field of endeavor for the therapy-
257. Id. at 53.
258. Id. at 52.
259. Id. at 53.
260. Shuchman, supra note 16, at 412-13 (footnotes omitted).
261. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, Part I, at 53.
262. Id. at 46; Shuchman, supra note 16, at 412, 468.
263. This paragraph is based on Caplan & Nelson, Who's To Blame?, PsYcnoLoGY
TooAY, Nov. 1974, at 99.
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oriented. Thus, simple self-interest skews social science toward per-
son-centered problem definition, research, and conclusions. Like a
four-year-old boy with a new birthday hammer who discovers that
everything needs hammering, the psychologist or social worker ascer-
tains that individuals are responsible for their own problems and urges
counseling to correct the observed defects. If the diagnosis is unchal-
lenged, helping figures will be provided to control the deviant individ-
uals. But person-oriented research neglects hard questions about so-
ciety. Before opprobrious personal conclusions are affixed, someone
might attempt to determine whether the person so described has suffi-
cient objective reasons to be troubled. What appears to an observer
as deviant behavior may be a rational response to an unfortunate situa-
tion.
Counseling's first premise is that there is something wrong with
the person counseled. Medical terminology like "diagnosis" and
"treatment ' '26 4 borrows prestige from a respected profession. The an-
alogy from curing disease and setting broken bones to rehabilitating
bankrupts is, however, broad and imperfect. It should be examined
skeptically and carefully. Similar devices exist: traffic judges compel
drinking drivers to attend a series of lectures on alcohol's unhealthy
potential; military commanders formerly summoned soldiers to movies
about the adverse consequences of certain sexual conduct. This ob-
server nevertheless must ask whether counseling, instead of being
genuinely therapeutic, is the social price imposed upon the bankrupt
in return for discharge. Is counseling the "sermon" and "ceremony"
Professor Stone referred to as part of the debt-extirpating ritual?2 6
The way policymakers define a problem determines both what is
done and what is not done about it. If personal characteristics cause
a problem, the solution can concentrate on individuals and ignore prob-
lems of the larger society. The Commission Report assumes that the
bankruptcy system is rooted in a credit-fueled, consumption economy.
The bankrupt, an overzealous consumer, must be educated and re-
turned to consume more wisely.266 Several questions may be asked
about the economic foundations of this model. On one plane, are a
society's accomplishments measured primarily by its level of produc-
tion? On another, is an individual's achievement indexed by his level
of consumption? 67 Should excessive credit consumption be construed
264. Stone, supra note 17, at 349, 354.
265. Id. at 361.
266. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, Part I, at 71.
267. J. GA BRArrH, TiE NEw INDuSTmIUL STATE 38 (1967).
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as evidence of inadequacy? Or may it be a reasonable response to a
materialistic society which creates demand and manages consump-
tion?2 68 Does consumption which creates debt liberate or stultify?2 69
If "unnecessary" buying sustains economic momentum, then should the
buyer of unnecessary items who cannot pay be viewed as a casualty
or a hero? Consumer bankruptcy may be a question not of failure but
of the standards of success. Perhaps the time approaches when people
cease to regard accumulating material goods as the measure of eco-
nomic success and the guarantee of human happiness.
The Commission Report deals with bankruptcy reform, not social
reform in general. By stressing personal causes and solutions, the re-
port may de-emphasize many variables and analogies. The present
Act was passed during the laissez-faire age. Reformers should consider
bankruptcy's part in the entire scheme of public regulation, for ex-
ample, the government's role in controlling economic fluctuation. Sta-
tistics from late 1974 and early 1975, the time this article was written,
will show rocketing bankruptcy filings. Perhaps the bankruptcy system
could develop a painless processing method for these victims of govern-
mental mismanagement. By centering on "internar' causes, the Com-
mission neglects these relationships.
If bankruptcy accomplishes social welfare functions, reformers
might explore existing welfare analogies. When the present Act was
passed, public welfare was limited to "indoor relief' in the county poor-
house and sparce general assistance. Intervening social and political
developments such as unemployment compensation, old age pensions,
survivors insurance, disability payments, public assistance, and changes
in the financing of medical services could be considered. One particu-
lar analogy bears mention. Bankruptcy, like other welfare programs,
has a stigma. Everyone talks about the stigma, but no one analyzes
it very thoroughly. Some view bankrupts as moral cripples, affix a
public assistance stigma, and oppose any revision; others view bank-
rupts as unfortunate victims, affix only a minor stigma, and favor com-
prehensive revision.Y0 The Commission proposals reflect -the second
orientation. 1
Some stigma remains. The proposal to counsel bankrupts reveals
an official conclusion that bankrupts, at a minimum, need to be edu-
268. Id. at 205.
269. Id. at 271-73.
270. CoMIssIoN REPORT, supra note 15, Part I, at 62; Shuchman, supra note 16,
at 416-17.
271. Kennedy, supra note 21, at 437.
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cated. Observers frequently assail public assistance, particularly aid to
dependent children, as demeaning. 272  In the 1960's, "services" were
provided to rehabilitate recipients of aid to dependent children.273
The romantic ideal collided with cold practicality. "Services," instead
of an exact concept, turned out to be an exceedingly fuzzy one. The
idea that trained caseworkers offering services would rehabilitate wel-
fare recipients failed to work in practice.27 4  Before bankruptcy em-
braces services, this precedent should be explored. It makes scant eco-
nomic sense to substitute a useless counselor for a lawyer.
Welfare is difficult to relate to bankruptcy. Few welfare recipi-
ents are candidates for bankruptcy, for they neither own enough assets
to lose much to creditors nor receive enough income to run up large
debts.27 5  The programs are not coordinated. At least in New York,
the welfare authorities refuse to pay extra benefits to enable welfare
recipients to file bankruptcy.276 If this is observed from the creditor's
point of view, the desire to affix a stigma appears more practical and
reasonable. The creditor is also a taxpayer. Must the creditor pay
taxes to pay welfare to pay the bankruptcy filing fee to discharge just
debts to allow the debtor a fresh start? Nevertheless, some scholars
support easing the application procedure in both bankruptcy and wel-
fare to make the process less demeaning and stigmatic." 7
Perhaps the food stamp program is a better analogy to bankruptcy
than the public assistance program. Certified low income consumers
purchase food stamps which buy more food than the stamps cost; the
difference between cost and face value varies with income, family size,
and "need." Food stamps, like bankruptcy, contain an element of
magic: the wonderful wizard turns a quarter into a dollar. However,
it is the kind of dollar which can only be spent for edible commodi-
ties. 78 There is one salient difference. Bankruptcy destroys just debts
without benefitting anyone except the bankrupt. But food stamps may
"create" wealth. In addition to aiding the needy, food stamps are a
272. See, e.g., G. STINER, supra note 31, at 49 (remarks by Representative Martha
Griffith).
273. Act of July 23, 1962, Pub. L. 87-543, § 101(a)(2), 76 Stat. 174 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 603(a) (3) (1970)).
274. G. STEiNER, supra note 31, at 24-25, 31, 37, 39.
275. Shuchman, supra note 16, at 468-69.
276. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 438 (1973).
277. G. STEINER, supra note 31, at 88-94; Shuchman, supra note 16, at 474; Note,
Eligibility Determinations in Public Assistance: Selected Problems and Proposals for
Reform in Pennsylvania, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1307 (1967).
278. See Bankruptcy Act § 17, 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1970) (debts not discharged); Pro-
posed Act § 4-506.
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thinly veiled subsidy to farmers and retail merchants.279 Food stamps,
viewed in this way, may be truly a free lunch.
There are some interesting food stamp-bankruptcy parallels.
Policymakers have failed to define either need or insolvency to dis-
qualify students with future income potential. Thus, many students are
eligible and sign up for food stamps to the apparent consternation of
the authorities.28 0  Also, many former students avail themselves of
bankruptcy and discharge the education loans which increased their
earning ability.2 " Accordingly, policymakers propose to limit student
eligibility for food stamps 82 and to attenuate dischargeability of educa-
tional loans. 283
As the preceding paragraph reveals, society is ambivalent about
both food stamps and bankruptcy. Some stigma against bankrupts and
food stamp recipients continues to exist. Many think that the bank-
ruptcy's stigma prevents eligible people from filing. 8 4 Also, labor
unions encourage laid-off members to apply for food stamps; but many
members hesitate or refuse because they view food stamps as wel-
fare."8 5 Some feel that food stamps are demeaning because they de-
prive the recipient of choice;286 food stamps will not purchase clothes
or even beer.287 The food stamp stigma differs from the bankruptcy
stigma. Few but the obdurately hardhearted object to feeding the hun-
gry. Moreover, the food stamp subsidy may be perceived either as a
device to return taxes previously paid or as the equivalent of the shel-
ter subsidy obtained by deducting local taxes and interest from federal
income tax. These destigmatizing analogies are inapplicable to bank-
ruptcy.
Low participation by eligible people troubles the food stamp pro-
gram.28   There are several reaons: procedural barriers such as inac-
cessable outlets, complex forms, surly officials, and long lines discour-
279. G. STEINER, supra note 31, at 200.
280. Richards, Students Get Food Stamps, The Washington Post, Nov. 5, 1974, §
C, at 1, col. 6.
281. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, Part I, at 176-77.
282. Richards, supra note 280.
283. Proposed Act § 4-506(8).
284. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, Part I, at 141; Shuchman, supra note 16,
at 413.
285. The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 12, 1974, at 1, col. 5.
286. G. STEINER, supra note 31, at 218, 236.
287. 7 C.F.R. §§ 270.2(s), 271.9(a) (1973) (recipients, however, may buy malt,
sugar, and yeast to brew their own beer).
288. G. STmNER, supra note 31, at 213-20; Anderson, The Food Crisis-Hunger
Persists in U.S. Despite Progress Made in Past Five Years, The Wall Street Journal, Dec.
3, 1974, at 1, col. 1 (fifteen of thirty million known eligible receive food stamps); The
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age some; many identify food stamps with public assistance and dis-
dain to participate; others are simply too poor to pay for food stamps;
and some are unaware of the program.2"" The Department of Agricul-
ture, which administers food stamps, shares some of the blame. The
statute mandates "outreach" efforts to "insure the participation of eligi-
ble households." 90 In Bennett v. Butz29 the court found that the De-
partment of Agriculture's outreach was dismal292 and a "total failure"
to carry out what Congress intended. 293
Bankruptcy may be compared. Several of the reasons for low
participation in the food stamp program apply equally to bankruptcy.
Procedural complexity, welfare stigma, poverty, 294 and ignorance limit
the number of bankrupts. No one knows how many are eligible for
a discharge.2 5  Further, the bankruptcy system does not advertise its
services .29 While a Commission-related study tends "to prefer bank-
ruptcy to remain a highly specialized process of limited legal relief and
restricted access,"2 97 several Commission proposals are in the nature
of "outreach." The idea of rehabilitation assuages stigma; people who
may be improved or treated are less disgusting. Bankruptcy will be
cheaper. The bankrupt may dispense with an attorney's fee, ' s and
indigents may file without a filing fee.290 The Bankruptcy Administra-
tion will be located in local offices and, thus, will be more physically
accessible.3"0 Agency personnel will disseminate information and ex-
pert advice to the debtor.210 There will generally be less procedural
complexity.302 Although massive advertising campaigns are not anti-
cipated, the proposed revision will have some "outreach" effect. It re-
mains to be seen whether a labor union will encourage laid-off, "insol-
Chapel Hill Newspaper, Nov. 17, 1974, § D, at 1, col. 1 (less than one-third of Orange
County's eligible receive food stamps).
289. Anderson, supra note 288; Mann, Group Says Many Fail to Ask for Food
Stamps, The Washington Post, Nov. 22, 1974, § C, at 4, col. 1; The Chapel Hill News-
paper, supra note 288.
290. 7 U.S.C. § 2019(e)(5) (1970). See also 7 C.F.R. 271.1(r) (1973).
291. 386 F. Supp. 1059 (D. Minn. 1974).
292. Id. at 1067.
293. Id. at 1065.
294. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
295. CoMMISsION REPORT, supra note 15, Part I, at 40, 46, 74; Shuchman, supra
note 16, at 468 n.186.
296. CoMMissIoN REPORT, supra note 15, Part I, at 50.
297. Id. at 62.
298. See id. at 160.
299. Proposed Act § 3-302(a)(1); CoMMissION REPORT, supra note 15, Part I, at
140-41.
300. CoMMIssioN REPORT, supra note 15, Part I, at 76, 118.
301. Id. at 47.
302. Id. at 76.
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vent" members to file for bankruptcy, and how the members and their
creditors will respond.
VI. CONCLUSION
In a changing world, institutions cannot pretend to finality. Bank-
ruptcy has long been ripe for reform. The Brookings study marshalled
the evidence and remorselessly laid bare bankruptcy's wastefulness and
irrationality. With the Commission Report and the Proposed Act,
bankruptcy reform is no longer a generality but has a practical focus.
Revision is a program rather than an article of faith. It may be asked,
however, whether the Proposed Act is an aspiration rather than an im-
mediate possibility. In 1969 the President told Congress that "tinker-
ing with the present welfare system is not enough,"3 3 but five years
have passed without comprehensive revision. The House and Senate
Judiciary Committees, through which bankruptcy revision must pass,
spent much of 1974 exercising constitutional duties over the executive
branch. These committees face an immense backlog of legislation. If
copyright and patent are any precedent, then social, commercial, and
technological superannuation of a statute does not automatically lead
to revision. The changes proposed for bankruptcy are far-reaching
and deserve to be considered carefully. Revision has been greeted
with less than universal approbation. The Proposed Act may, there-
fore, be the field upon which the contending forces cancel one another
out. 04 Revising the present Act to conform to the rules and forms,
it is submitted, should not be delayed by the prospect of passing the
Proposed Act.
The fundamental problem is what to do with an unsuccessful ad-
versary process. Process colors substance, and substance colors proc-
ess. Procedure is an important instrument for advancing social goals.
When substance is vague or complex and policies conflict, procedural
questions assume increased importance. Although the adversary
model is basic to our thinking about resolving disputes, the adversary
system is not chiseled into stone. Concepts of proper procedure shift
from time to time. Welfare, previously parens patriae-administrative,
developed adversary-adjudicative procedure.305  Prejudgment debt
collection, formerly ex parte, is developing adversary procedure.30 6
303. G. STEINER, supra note 31, at 11.
304. Lee, supra note 1, at 933, 938.
305. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See also O'Neil, Of Justice Delayed
and Justice Denied: The Welfare Prior Hearing Cases, 1970 Sup. Cr. REv. 161.
306. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin., 395 U.S. 337
(1969). But cf. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
1975] 1235
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Bankruptcy, conceived as adversary, shifts toward administrative and
perhaps to administrative-therapeutic. Procedural solutions to social
problems will be formulated, tried, modified, rejected, and reformu-
lated.
We have moved away from the idea that bankruptcy should be
complex and perhaps punitive so that it will not be too easy.807 We
have, at the same time, moved toward the idea that "the process of
bankruptcy need not be made unpleasant." 08 Procedure reflects this
movement. Perhaps this is related to changes in the nature of debt,
more particularly to the development of institutional, incorporated, in-
veterate creditors. Professor Stone's perceptive point may be
repeated: "as . . . the debtor-creditor relationship becomes even less
personal, the element of 'social wrong' involved in not paying one's
debts will diminish and finally lose itself among balance sheets and sta-
tistics. °3 0 9 Some stigma remains. The Commission, in concluding that
bankruptcy's problems can be solved by an administrative restructur-
ing, may fail fully to consider the symbolic, impalpable, and intangible
values advanced and retarded by procedural systems.
307. See StQne, supra note 17, at 345.
308. Shuchman, supra note 16, at 474.
309. Stone, supra note 17, at 361. See also Shuchman, supra note 16, at 429-31,
474-75.
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